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Nonpossessory security interests in personal property, such
as those created by chattel mortgages and conditional sales
contracts2 are commonplace; yet there are surprisingly few
cases analyzing many of the legal consequences which may result
from the negligent damage or destruction of the collateral.
Most of the existing cases have involved the right of the secured
party or the debtor to proceed against a negligent third party.
However, the collateral frequently may be damaged or destroyed
as a result of the debtor's negligence or the combined negligence
of the debtor and a third party. The first part of this Article
will analyze the possible legal consequences of such damage or
destruction.
Problems also may arise if any of the parties is insured and
his insurer asserts subrogation rights. Commonly the interests
of both the debtor and secured party will be insured in one
policy. Where this occurs the insurer has usually been subro-
gated to the rights of the secured party against the third party.
The second part of this Article will demonstrate that this result
is clearly erroneous.
II. RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES ABSENT INSURANCE
As in the situation where the collateral is. damaged' or de-
* Member of the Minnesota Bar.
1. The scope of this Article is limited to personal property, al-
though generally the same principles would apply to security interests
in realty. Frequently, cases involving realty are cited as analogous to
personalty cases in regard to problems discussed in this Article. See, e.g.,
1 T. SEDGWiCK, DAMAGES 111 (1891).
2. For the purposes of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
no distinction is made between chattel mortgages, conditional sale con-
tracts, or other particular types of security interests. UuFoimu CoM-
MERCIAL CODE § 9-102(2), Comment 2. However, the -Code does dis-
tinguish between two general types: possessory security interests
and nonpossessory security interests. Possessory. security interests are
those that give the secured party possession of the collateral. This
possession gives notice to third parties of the secured party's' interest.
Nonpossessory security interests are those that give possession to the
debtor. Notice of the secured party's interest is given by filing written
notice in a public registry.
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stroyed by an act of God, the debtor remains liable to the se-
cured party on the outstanding debt3 when the collateral is
damaged or destroyed by the negligence of the debtor or a third
party. Furthermore, the security interest remains effective as to
the collateral when it is only damaged and not totally destroyed.4
The only effect of the ngligence of the debtor or third party is to
create possible tort liability in them.
A. COLLATERAL DAMAGED BY THE SOLE NEGLIGENCE OF
A THIRD PARTY
Generally either title or possession will be an interest
sufficient to support a negligence action. Consequently, either
the debtor or the secured party may separately maintain an ac-
tion against a third party tortfeasor.5 The secured party must
generally rely on title to support his action, since by definition
his nonpossessory security interest leaves the debtor in posses-
sion.6 If the particular security agreement gives the secured
3. Jolly v. Thornton, 40 Cal. App. 2d 819, 102 P.2d 467 (1940); Gas
City Transfer Co. v. Miller, 107 Ind. App. 210, 21 N.E.2d 428 (1939)
(en bane); Marion Mfg. Co. v. Buchanm, 118 Tenn. 238, 99 S.W. 984
(1907).
4. Jolly v. Thornton, 40 Cal. App. 2d 819, 102 P.2d 467 (1940).
5. E.g., Lake City Auto Fin. Co. v. Waldron, 83 So. 2d 877 (Fla.
1955) (en bane); Motor Fin. Co. v. Noyes, 139 Me. 159, 28 A.2d 235
(1942); Associates Discount Corp. v. Gillineau, 322 Mass. 490, 78 N.E.2d
192 (1948). Contra, Commercial Credit Co. v. Standard Baking Co., 45
Ohio App. 403, 187 N.E. 251 (1933) (only party in possession may
maintain the action).
6. See, e.g., Milton Mfg. Co. v. Chicago, B. & 0. Ry., 237 F. 118
(S.D. Iowa 1916); Southern Ry. v. Chambless, 10 Ala. App. 326, 65
So. 417, cert. denied, 187 Ala. 672, 65 So. 1034 (1914); Chicago, R.L &
Pac. Ry. v. Earl, 121 Ark. 514, 181 S.W. 925 (1916); Jolly v. Thornton,
40 Cal. App. 2d 819, 102 P.2d 467 (1940); Smith v. Gufford, 36 Fla. 481,
18 So. 717 (1895); Ryals v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 158 Ga. 303, 123 S.E.
12 (1924); Universal Credit Co. v. Collier, 108 Ind. App. 685, 31 N.E.2d
646 (1941) (en bane); Bell Fin. Co. v. Gefter, 337 Mass. 69, 147 N.E.2d
815 (1958); Lacey v. Great N. Ry., 70 Mont. 346, 225 P. 808 (1924); First
Nat'l Acceptance Corp. v. Annett, 121 N.J.L. 356, 2 A.2d 650 (Sup. Ct.
1938), affd, 124 N.J.L. 78, 11 A.2d 106 (Ct. Err. & App. 1940); Stewart
Motor Truck, Inc. v. New York City, 158 Misc. 738, 287 N.Y.S. 881 (N.Y.
Mun. Ct. 1936); Harris v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 190 N.C. 480, 130 S.E.
319 (1925); Wylie v. Ohio River & C. Ry., 48 S.C. 405, 26 S.E. 676 (1897)
(title as of date of damage). Contra, Remedial Sys. of Loaning v. New
Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 227 Ky. 652, 13 S.W.2d 1005 (1929) (semble);
Commercial Credit Co. v. Standard Baking Co., 45 Ohio App. 403, 187
N.E. 251 (1933).
That title in the secured party may be defeasible is not a defense.
Vangello v. East Side Say. Bank, 11 N.Y.S.2d 982 (Rochester City Ct.
1939). If at the time of suit the debt has been completely paid, the
secured party may not maintain the action. 1 T. SEDGwici, DAMAGES
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party only a lien interest rather than title, the secured party
has not generally been permitted to maintain an action.7 How-
ever, even though the secured party has only a lien interest, if
the debtor is actually in default, the secured party has at the
very least a right to possession," which may enable him to
maintain an action.9 The debtor, on the other hand, always has
a sufficient formal interest in the collateral to maintain a negli-
gence action since by definition he has possession.1 0
111 (1891). See Lacey v. Great N. Ry., supra. Cf. Flint Frozen Foods,
Inc. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 8 N.J. 606, 86 A.2d 673 (1952).
7. Bankers Inv. Co. v. Calloway, 183 Kan. 1, 325 P.2d 66 (1958);
Commercial See., Inc. v. Mast, 145 Ore. 394, 28 P.2d 635 (1934). Contra,
Cresbard Grain Co. v. Farnham, 60 S.D. 179, 244 N.W. 91 (1932).
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503.
9. Banker's Inv. Co. v. Calloway, 183 Kan. 1, 325 P.2d 66 (1958);
Cosgriff Neon Co. v. Mattheus, 78 Nev. 281, 371 P.2d 819 (1962); Com-
merical Sec., Inc. v. Mast, 145 Ore. 394, 28 P.2d 635 (1934); Carter v.
Haynes, 269 S.W. 216 (Tex. Ct. App. 1925) (by implication). The right
to possession must be as of the date of damage to the collateral.
Bankers Inv. Co. v. Calloway, supra.
10. E.g., J.P. (Bum) Gibbins, Inc. v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 202
F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1953); Smith v. Louisville & N. Ry., 208 Ala. 440,
94 So. 489 (1922); Pickwick Stages Corp. v. Gil, 38 Ariz. 7, 296 P. 269
(1931); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Earl, 121 Ark. 514, 181 S.W. 925
(1916); Jolly v. Thornton, 40 Cal. App. 2d 819, 102 P.2d 467 (1940);
Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 92 Conn. 252, 102 A. 573 (1917);
Harper v. Donaldson, 49 Ga. App. 608, 176 S.E. 535 (1934); Anduha v.
Maui County, 30 Hawaii 44 (1927); Craig v. Lee, 81 Ind. App. 319,
142 N.E. 399 (1924); Miller & Kizer v. Des Moines City Ry., 96 Iowa
1033, 195 N.W. 600 (1938); City of Topeka v. Tuttle, 5 Kan. 186
(1870); Lacaze v. Morway, 57 So. 2d 791, 794 (La. App. 1952); Reme-
dial Sys. of Loaning v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 227 Ky. 652, 13
S.W.2d 1005 (1929) (by implication); Associates Discount Corp. v.
Gillineau, 322 Mass. 490, 78 N.E.2d 192 (1948); Motor Fin. Co. v.
Noyes, 139 Me. 159, 28 A.2d 235 (1942); Wohiwend v. J.I. Case Thresh-
ing Mach. Co., 42 Minn. 500, 44 N.W. 517 (1890) (by implication);
Mossler Acceptance Co. v. Moore, 218 Miss. 757, 67 So. 2d 868 (1953)
(by implication); Smith v. Cowen, 350 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. App. 1961);
Lacey v. Great N. Ry., 70 Mont. 346, 225 P. 808 (1924); Carter v. Black
& White Cab Co., 102 Misc. 680, 169 N.Y.S. 441 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Harris
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 190 N.C. 480, 130 S.E. 319 (1925); Wilkes v.
Southern Ry., 85 S.C. 346, 67 S.E. 292 (1910) (by implication); Union
Ry. v. Remedial Fin. Co., 163 Tenn. 130, 40 S.W.2d 1034 (1931); Superior
Lloyds of America v. Boesch Loan Co., 153 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941); Gover v. Central Vt. Ry., 96 Vt. 208, 118 A. 874 (1922); Helf v.
Hansen & Keller Truck Co., 167 Wash. 206, 9 P.2d 110 (1932).
It is frequently observed that the underlying obligation may be
secured by other, undamaged collateral. In such a case, the secured
party may not want to seek recovery from the tortfeasor but would
rather proceed against this other collateral if the debtor defaults. Thus,
it is reasoned that the debtor must have some remedy. Capital Loan
& Sav. Co. v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 44 Ohio App. 251, 184 N.E. 862 (1933);
Wilkes v. Southern Ry., supra. However, generally the debtor may
maintain an action even though the debt exceeds the value of collateral
10031968]
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While it has been uniformly held that the debtor may re-
cover from the tortfeasor for the entire damage done to the col-
lateral," courts are split as to the araount of damages a secured
party may recover.12  A slight majority of jurisdictions allows
the secured party to recover only to the extent that he is
damaged.' 3 In those jurisdictions the problem becomes one of
defining his loss.
No one would question that a security interest is damaged
when the collateral itself is damaged or destroyed.14 If the
debtor defaults on the underlying obligation, the secured party
would realize less than what he would have otherwise realized
upon any disposition of the damaged collateral. However, the
actual loss is not realized immediately upon the injury to the
collateral; rather the loss is in the increased possibility that, if
default occurs, the collateral will be insufficient to satisfy the
debt. Thus, the damage should be measured by the difference
between the value of the debtor's obligation as secured by the
and even though the debtor is in default. E.g., City of Topeka v.
Tuttle, supra. The debtor may proceed against the tortfeasor because
he remains liable on the underlying obligation, and so long as he re-
mains solvent, the secured party may choose to hold him liable
rather than seek to recover from the tortfeasor in a negligence ac-
tion. To maintain the action, the debtor need only be in possession at
the time the damage occurs. Thus the action may be maintained even
though the secured party takes possession of the collateral before the
debtor commences his action, Miller & Kizer v. Des Moines City Ry.,
supra, and even though the secured party subsequently sells the
damaged collateral in satisfaction of the debt, Jolly v. Thornton, supra.
11. Rentz v. Huckabee Auto Co., 52 Ga. App. 329, 185 S.E. 575
(1936); Gas City Transfer Co. v. Miller, 107 Ind. App. 210, 21 N.E.2d
428 (1939) (en banc); Associates Discount Corp. v. Gillineau, 322 Mass.
490, 78 N.E.2d 192 (1948); Ellis v. Snell, 44 Tenn. App. 294, 313 S.W.2d
558 (1955). The argument that the debtor may only recover up to the
amount of his equity in the collateral has been uniformly rejected.
E.g., Ellis v. Snell, supra.
12. In Donnel v. G.G. Deering Co., 115 Me. 32, 97 A. 130 (1916)
it was suggested that a secured party could only recover for the dam-
age done to whatever possessory interest he might have. However,
that case appears to have been overruled by Motor Fin. Co. v. Noyes,
139 Me. 159, 28 A.2d 235 (1942).
13. Rentz v. Huckabee Auto Co., 53 Ga. App. 327, 186 S.E. 575
(1936); Ellis Motor Co. v. Hancock, 38 Ga. App. 788, 145 S.E. 518 (1928);
Universal Credit Co. v. Collier, 108 Ind. App. 685, 31 N.E.2d 646 (1941)
(collateral damaged after default); Miller v. Hartman-Salem Co., 145 So.
186 (La. App. 1933); Lacey v. Great N. Ry., 70 Mont. 346, 225 P. 808
(1924); Cosgriff Neon Co. v. Mattheus, 78 Nev. 281, 371 P.2d 819 (1962);
Cresbard Grain Co. v. Farnham, 60 S.D. 179, 244 N.W. 91 (1932) (while
damage exceeded debt, suit only for amount of debt); Louisville & N.
Ry. v. Mack, 2 Tenn. Civ. App. 194 (1911).
14. Universal Credit Co. v. Collier, 108 Ind. App. 685, 31 N.E.2d
646 (1941).
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undamaged property and its value as secured by the damaged
property. However, determining these respective values may
be difficult and, presumably for this reason, the secured party's
interest in the collateral has been defined simply as the amount
of the outstanding debt.15
Thus, the majority rule is that the secured party may re-
cover from the tortfeasor for the actual damage to the collateral
not exceeding the amount of the outstanding debt. 16 However,
the secured party is not allowed to recover both damages from
the tortfeasor up to the amount of the debt and the same
amount from the debtor on the underlying obligation; the
amount the secured party recovers from the tortfeasor must be
credited against the debtor's obligation. 7
A large minority of jurisdictions, however, does not limit the
secured party's recovery to the amount of the outstanding debt;
rather, the secured party is allowed to maintain an action for the
entire amount of damage to the collateral, even if the damage
exceeds the amount of the debt.' 8 However, the secured party
is not allowed a windfall. As in the majority jurisdictions, any
recovery up to the amount of the debt must be credited to that
15. See cases cited in note 13 supra.
16. Id. It has often been argued that the secured party's recovery
should be reduced by the salvage value of the damaged property.
For example, if an outstanding debt of $500 is secured by collateral
that has been damaged to the extent of $400 but has a salvage value of$200, the recovery arguably should not exceed the balance between the
debt and the salvage value, or under these facts, $300. This argument
has been uniformly rejected, based on the rationale that until the debt
is satisfied the secured party is entitled to have the collateral com-
pletely unimpaired. Bell Fin. Co. v. Gefter, 337 Mass. 69, 145 N.E.2d 815(1958); Wylie v. Ohio River & C. Ry., 48 S.C. 405, 26 S.E. 676 (1897).
Accord, Rentz v. Huckabee Auto Co., 53 Ga. App. 329, 185 S.E. 575 (1936).
This rationale is understandable if there has been no default, because
the secured party cannot yet realize on the collateral. If the secured
party could recover for damages only up to the excess of the debt over
the salvage value and the collateral subsequently depreciates even
further before default, the collateral might then be insufficient to satisfy
the balance after default. Conversely, had the property not been
damaged initially, the secured party might have been satisfied even if
the collateral had subsequently depreciated somewhat. Nevertheless, the
general rule that the salvage value does not reduce the recovery has
been applied even after default and execution of the security. Gooding
v. Shea, 103 Mass. 360 (1869) (suit for conversion rather than negli-
gence).
17. Ellis Motor Co. v. Hancock, 38 Ga. App. 780, 145 S.E. 518 (1928).
18. Harvard Trust Co. v. Racheotes, 337 Mass. 73, 147 N.E.2d 817(1958); Bell Fin. Co. v. Gefter, 337 Mass. 69, 147 N.E.2d 815 (1958);
Wylie v. Ohio River & C. Ry., 48 S.C. 405, 26 S.E. 676 (1897); Louisville
& N. Ry. v. Mack 2 Tenn. Civ. App. 194 (1911).
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debt. Any excess recovery must be held in constructive trust
for the benefit of the debtor.19
While both the secured party and the debtor may maintain
negligence actions against the tortfeasor, there are only a few
cases which consider whether the debtor's recovery is a bar to a
subsequent action by the secured party, and there are none which
deal with the converse situation. It has generally been stated
that the debtor's recovery from the tortfeasor will bar a subse-
quent action by the secured party.-" Clearly a properly re-
corded security interest does not place the tortfeasor on con-
structive notice of the secured party's interest since the tort-
feasor is not a "purchaser for value.121 It is unclear whether a
tortfeasor who does have actual knowledge of the secured party's
interest at the time he settles with the debtor may successfully
plead that settlement as a bar to the secured party's subsequent
action.22 However, it is clear that if the secured party makes
19. Harvard Trust Co. v. Racheotes, 337 Mass. 73, 147 N.E.2d 817(1958); Bell Fin. Co. v. Gefter, 337 Mass. '73, 145 N.E.2d 815 (1958).
20. E.g., Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Earl, 121 Ark. 514, 181 S.W. 925
(1916); Smith v. Gufford, 36 Fla. 481, :[8 So. 717 (1895); Associates
Discount Corp. v. Gillineau, 322 Mass. 490, 78 N.E.2d 192 (1948); Harris
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 190 N.C. 480, .30 S.E. 319 (1925); Universal
Credit Co. v. Collier, 108 Ind. App. 685, 31 N.E.2d 646 (1941) (en banc);
Capital Loan & Say. Co. v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 44 Ohio App. 251,
184 N.E. 862 (1933). Contra, Lacey v. Great N. Ry., 70 Mont. 346,
225 P. 808 (1924).
Of course, an unsuccessful suit by the debtor is likewise resjudicata in a subsequent action by the secured party. Union Ry. v.
Remedial Fin. Co., 163 Tenn. 130, 40 S.W.2d 1034 (1931).
21. Most constructive notice statutes are limited in their applica-
tion to "purchasers for value." Motor F'*n. Co. v. Noyes, 139 Me. 159,
28 A.2d 235 (1942); Dyer v. Great N. Ry., 51 Minn. 345, 53 N.W. 714
(1892); Loeb v. Chicago, St. L. & N.O. Ry., 60 Miss. 933 (1883).
22. One jurisdiction has explicitly held that actual notice does not
preclude the debtor's prior recovery from barring the secured party's
action. Mercer v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 211 N.C. 288, 189 S.E. 762
(1937). A similar result is suggested by cases in which, although it was
not presented with the actual notice issue, the court states that absent
"fraud and collusion," the debtor's recovery bars a subsequent action
by the secured party. Lowery v. Louisville & N. Ry., 228 Ala. 137,
153 So. 467 (1934); Smith v. Gufford, 36 Fla. 481, 18 So. 717 (1895);
Ellis Motor Co. v. Hancock, 38 Ga. App. 788, 145 S.E. 518 (1928); Univer-
sal Credit Co. v. Collier, 108 Ind. App. 685, 31 N.E.2d 646 (1941)
(en banc); Harris v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 190 N.C. 480, 130 S.E. 319
(1925). It has also been held in some jurisdictions that the tort-
feasor, when being sued by the debtor, cannot defend on the grounds
that the damaged property was subject to a security interest. Ili-
nois Cent. R.R. v. Hawkins, 65 Miss. 200. 3 So. 410 (1887); Martin v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry., 108 S.C. 130, 93 S.E. 336 (1917); Stotts v. Puget
Sound Traction, Light & Power Co., 94 Wash. 338, 162 P. 519 (1917).
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an actual demand on the tortfeasor that settlement be made with
him, the tortfeasor may not successfully plead settlement with
the debtor as a bar.23 If the debtor's action for any reason is a
bar to the secured party's subsequent action, the secured party's
remedy is an action against the debtor to impose a constructive
trust on any recovery the debtor receives.24
Although no case holds that an action by the secured party
bars an action by the debtor, several opinions contain dicta to the
effect that, absent fraud or collusion, the debtor's action would be
barred.2G This result appears to be reasonable, at least if the
damage does not exceed the debt, since such recovery is to be
applied to the discharge of the debt, and thus the debtor has been
Since the tortfeasor could not advance such a defense unless he had
actual knowledge and since those courts held that his only remedy is
an interpleader, it follows that in those jurisdictions, actual notice
does not preclude the debtor's action from barring a subsequent action
by the secured party.
However, consider those cases holding that a properly recorded
security interest does not give constructive notice, see cases cited note
20 supra. Had actual notice been considered irrelevant, no detailed
consideration of constructive notice would have been necessary.
23. Milton Mfg. Co. v. Chicago, B. & 0. R.R., 237 F. 118 (S.D. Iowa
1916); Lake City Auto Fin. Co. v. Waldron, 83 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1955)(en banc); Commercial Sec., Inc. v. Mast, 145 Ore. 394, 28 P.2d 635(1934). Contra, Ellis Motor Co. v. Hancock, 38 Ga. App. 780, 145 S.E.
518 (1928).
However, in Lake City Auto Fin. Co. v. Waldron, supra, the Florida
Court held that when demand is made upon the tortfeasor or his in-
surer and he expressly refuses to settle with the secured party, the se-
cured party's subsequent action will nevertheless be barred. Compare
Smith v. Gufford, 36 Fla. 481, 18 So. 717 (1895).
24. Rentz v. Huckabee Auto Co., 53 Ga. App. 329, 185 S.E. 575(1936); Motor Fin. Co. v. Noyes, 139 Me. 159, 28 A.2d 235 (1942); Harris
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 190 N.C. 480, 130 S.E. 319 (1925); Caro-
lina, C. & 0. Ry. v. Unaka Springs Lumber Co., 130 Tenn. 354, 170
S.W. 591 (1914).
It has also been suggested that a common count for "money had
and received" could be maintained, Smith v. Gufford, 36 Fla. 481, 18
So. 717 (1895), or an equitable action could be brought to compel
application of the debtor's judgment toward the loan. Commercial
Credit Co. v. Standard Baking Co., 45 Ohio App. 403, 187 N.E. 251 (1933).
25. The strongest and most considered dicta appears in Rentz v.
Huckabee Auto Co., 53 Ga. App. 329, 331, 185 S.E. 575, 576 (1936) (lan-
guage quoted is from the official report only): "On recovery of the
entire damages alleged by the [secured party] to have been sustained
by the property, which in this case is an amount less than the balance
due on the purchase-price, no other recovery can be had against the[debtor]." More general dicta appears in many cases: Chicago, R.I. &
Pac. Ry. v. Earl, 121 Ark. 514, 181 S.W. 925 (1916); Harris v. Seaboard Air
Line Ry., 190 N.C. 480, 130 S.E. 319 (1925); Ellis v. Snell, 44 Tenn. App.
294, 313 S.W. 2d 558 (1955); Union Ry. v. Remedial Fin. Co., 163 Tenn.
130, 40 S.W.2d 1034 (1931); Carolina, C. & 0. Ry. v. Unaka Springs Lum-
ber Co., 130 Tenn. 354, 170 S.W. 591 (1914).
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benefited to the fullest possible extent by the secured party's
recovery.2-6  Furthermore, in those jurisdictions allowing the
secured party to recover in excess of the outstanding debt, that
excess must be held in constructive trust for the benefit of the
debtor. Thus, the debtor has been benefited to the full extent
of his loss by the secured party's recovery. In contrast, if the
damage exceeds the debt, the secured party's recovery should
not be held to be a total bar to the debtor's action in the juris-
dictions that do not permit the secured party to recover in
excess of the outstanding debt. To hold that it is a total bar
would prevent the debtor from being compensated either di-
rectly or indirectly for any damage to his interest in the col-
lateral to the extent that his interest exceeds the outstanding
debt.27
Jurisdictions which allow recovery in excess of the outstand-
ing debt have not as yet considered the question of whether the
secured party not only may,28 but in fact must seek the total
amount of damages if he sues at all. Assuming that the rea-
son for allowing recovery of the excess is to avoid multiplicity
of actions, 29 it follows that the secured party should be re-
quired to seek the total damages. If it were left to his discretion
to sue for the excess, he most likely would not, since he is under
an obligation to hold such amounts in constructive trust for
the benefit of the debtor.30  Thus, the only effective way to
26. Rentz v. Huckabee Auto Co., 53 Ga. App. 329, 185 S.E. 575
(1936).
27. In Gas City Transfer Co. v. Miller, 107 Ind. App. 210, 21 N.E.
428 (1939) (en banc), the court held that the secured party could not
maintain a negligence action against the third party tortfeasor on the
grounds that such an action could only be for the value of the debt
and would bar the debtor from recovering his equity in the collateral.
28. The court in Harvard Trust Co. v. Racheotes, 337 Mass. 73,
147 N.E.2d 817 (1958), holds only that the secured party may recover
in excess of the debt.
29. Jurisdictions allowing the secured party to recover in excess of
the debt have not articulated their reasons for such a holding. See
cases cited note 25 supra. It would seem that the only policy supporting
such a rule would be that of avoiding multiplicity of suits, i.e., a suit
by the secured party for damages up to the amount of the debt and
then a subsequent suit by the debtor for the excess. Gas City Trans-
fer Co. v. Miller, 107 Ind. App. 210, 21 N.E. 428 (1939) (en banc).
30. Since the secured party has little incentive to recover the value
of the loss over and above the amount of the debt, something must be
done to either force him to make a good faith effort or to protect the
debtor in some other way. This might be done by allowing the secured
party to recover a pro rata share of his attorney fees from the debtor,
if he has been successful in recovering the excess; by permitting the
debtor to recover the excess, if the secured party did not make a good
faith effort to do so; or by providing for both.
1008 [Vol. 52:1001
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further the policy of avoiding multiple actions is to require that
he sue for the total amount.
B. COLLATERAL DAMAGED BY THE SOLE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEBTOR
When the negligence of the debtor causes damage to the
collateral, the secured party should be able to maintain a negli-
gence action against the debtor. While no court has been pre-
sented with such a case, dicta in one opinion has recognized this
possibility.3 1 A secured party with title to the collateral has a
sufficient interest to maintain a negligence action against third
parties. Furthermore, many cases hold that the secured party
may sue the debtor for conversion of the collateral.32 Thus,
there is no reason why the secured party should not be able to
maintain a negligence action against the debtor.3 3
One can only speculate as to why no case has been re-
ported in which a secured party has sought to recover against
the debtor for the negligent destruction of the collateral. 34 Pre-
sumably the explanation is that, in the usual case where the
collateral is damaged or destroyed, the secured party will be
able to recover immediately from the debtor on the underlying
obligation. This immediate recovery is facilitated by the liberal
31. Lacey v. Great N. Ry., 70 Mont. 346, 225 P. 808 (1924). In this
regard consider the ambiguous dicta in Finance Corp. v. King, 150 Colo.
13, 17-18, 370 P.2d 432, 435 (1962) (en banc): "And while the defendant
was so in possession of the automobile, the law imposes upon him
the duty to use care in use of the chattle [sic]; and he is only liable for
the willful damage to the chattle [sic] mortgage."
32. Annot., 73 A.L.R. 799 (1931).
33. The Uniform Commercial Code arguably provides some au-
thority against such an action. The Code states that in the case of a
possessory security interest, the secured party must exercise "reason-
able care" with regard to the collateral. UNmFomVt Commn cIAaL CODE
§ 9-207 (1). A negative implication may possibly be drawn from the
failure of the Code to provide a duty of care in the converse situa-
tion. However, this argument based on negative implications is not too
strong given the general common law duty of due care.
34. It might have been expected that such an action would have
been brought in the situation where the debtor went through bank-
ruptcy after negligently damaging the property. See Finance Co. v.
King, 150 Colo. 13, 370 P.2d 432 (1962). In such a case the underlying
obligation would have been "discharged" since it was "provable,"
see generally W. CoLLIER, BA.mRqupTcy MANuAL § 57.07 (ed. W. Laube &
W. Hill, 1966), but the tort claim for damages would not be "discharged"
since it would not be "provable" if the action had not been commenced
and pending at the time the "petition" was filed, id. § 63.29. However
it might be argued that "discharge" of the underlying obligation, like
satisfaction bars the secured party's negligence action. Cf. 1 T. SEDGWIcK,
DAMAGE S 111 (1891).
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interpretation given acceleration clauses. For example, the Uni-
form Commercial Code provides that the underlying obligation
may be accelerated by the creditor whenever he, in good faith,
believes that the obligation is impaiced. 5 Thus, when the col-
lateral is damaged or destroyed, he would, in most situations,
justifiably consider the underlying debt to be impaired and
could then immediately accelerate the time for payment. Pro-
ceeding on the underlying obligation would be preferable to a
negligence action, since the secured party would not have to
prove either damage or the negligence itself.
C. COLLATERAL DAMAGED BY THE CoiBINEm NEGLIGENCE OF THE
DEBTOR AND TiRD PARTY
Obviously the debtor's own negligence should bar his re-
covery against a third party tortfeasor in a jurisdiction that rec-
ognizes the doctrine of contributory negligence. 36 It is equally
clear that the debtor as a joint tortfeasor is as liable to the se-
cured party as if he were the sole tortfeasor. The more difficult
questions are how and to what extent his negligence affects the
secured party's right of action against the third party.
Courts have uniformly held that the debtor's negligence
is not imputed to the secured party,3 - reasoning that the secured
party has no more control over his debtor than a bailor normally
has over his bailee. Thus, since negligence is not imputed in
the bailment situation, it will not be imputed in the secured
transaction.3
On the other hand, the debtor's negligence may be a partial
limitation on the secured party's right to recover in jurisdictions
that allow recovery by the secured party in excess of the out-
standing debt. If the debtor is negligent and therefore cannot
recover directly against the tortfeasor, it follows that the secured
party should not be allowed to recover the excess as constructive
35. U=rOmVi COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-208.
36. E.g., Anduha v. Maui County, .30 Hawaii 44 (1927); Harvard
Trust Co. v. Racheotes, 337 Mass. 73, 147 N.E.2d 817 (1958).
37. Coonse v. Bechold, 71 Ind. App. 663, 125 N.E. 416 (1919); Har-
vard Trust Co. v. Racheotes, 337 Mass. 73, 147 N.E.2d 817 (1958); Morris
Plan Co. v. Hillcrest Farms Dairy, Inc., 323 Mass. 452, 82 N.E.2d 889
(1948); Lacey v. Great N. Ry., 70 Mont. 346, 225 P. 808 (1924); Commer-
cial Credit Corp. v. Satterthwaite, 107 N.J.L. 17, 150 A. 235 (Sup. Ct.
1930).
38. Lacey v. Great N. Ry., 70 Mont. 346, 225 P. 808 (1924); Commer-




trustee for the benefit of the debtor.39 Thus, even in the juris-
dictions generally following the minority rule regarding the se-
cured party's recovery, the secured party will not be allowed to
recover for damages in excess of the outstanding debt when the
debtor is contributorily negligent.40
Since both the debtor and the tortfeasor are liable to the
secured party, the question becomes whether the one initially
proceeded against may recover over against the other. The for-
mal requisites for contribution or indemnity may well be present:
If both are of equal fault, the one satisfying their common lia-
bility to the secured party may seek contribution from the
other.41 On the other hand, if they are not of equal fault, as
where the debtor is passively negligent while the third party is
actively negligent, then the one of lesser fault may seek indem-
nity from the other, assuming the former had satisfied their
liability to the secured party.42
However, regardless of whether the debtor and the third
party are of equal fault, the debtor should ultimately bear the
entire loss. But for the fact that the debtor had given a security
interest in the property, he would have born the entire loss,
since his contributory negligence would have prevented his re-
covery of any damages. The interest of the secured party is
extremely limited. As between the debtor and secured party,
the security interest becomes choate only upon a default on the
underlying debt 4 3 .--an event which may never occur. If there
is no default and the obligation is satisfied, the security inter-
39. Harvard Trust Co. v. Racheotes, 337 Mass. 73, 147 N.E.2d 817
(1958). It follows that other defenses which the third party may have
against the debtor would have the same effect. Milton Mfg. Co. v.
Chicago, B. & 0. Ry., 237 F. 118 (S.D. Iowa 1916).
40. Harvard Trust Co. v. Racheotes, 337 Mass. 73, 147 N.E.2d 817
(1958).
41. Contribution generally results in the concurrent tortfeasors
equally sharing the liability. E.g., Russell v. United States, 113 F. Supp.
353 (M.D. Pa. 1953); Showers v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 350 (M.D.
Pa. 1953); Mulding v. St. Louis, K.C. & C.R.R., 116 Mo. App. 655, 94
S.W. 801 (1906); Hucherson v. State, 105 W. Va. 184, 142 S.E. 444 (1928).
However, in some jurisdictions the concurrent tortfeasors share the lia-
bility in proportion to the relative fault. Little v. Miles, 213 Ark. 225,
212 S.W.2d 935 (1948); Mitchell v. Branch, 45 Hawaii 128, 363 P.2d 969
(1961); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
42. E.g., Miller v. Pennsylvania R.R., 236 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1956);
Chicago Great W. Ry. v. Casura, 234 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1956); South-
western Bell Tel. Co. v. East Texas Pub. Serv. Co., 48 F.2d 23 (5th
Cir. 1931).
43. UN MoM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-503, 9-504(1).
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est automatically terminates. 44 Furthermore, in regard to other
claims by third parties, the debtor rather than the secured party
is liable as the sole owner of the property. For example, stat-
utes imposing liability on the owner of an automobile typically
define "owner" as the debtor rather than the secured party,
regardless of who has title to the automobile.40 Hence, it is
clear that the mere existence of the security interest should not
shift any part of this burden from the debtor to the third party.46
Once it is recognized that, as between the debtor and the
third party, the debtor should ultimately bear the loss, a rem-
edy for the third party must be found. There is no statutory
remedy. Furthermore, it is not reasonable to expect a remedy to
be provided by statute,47 since there is no readily recognizable
interest group which would benefit from such legislation and,
thus, would have pushed for its adoption.48 In addition, it is
quite clear that a court, in exercise of its equitable jurisdiction,
could provide a remedy by subrogating the third party tort-
feasor to the rights of the secured party against the debtor.49
Since in good conscience the total loss resulting from the dam-
44. The debtor may file a "termination statement" which he has
demanded from the secured party. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-
404. However this provision does not mean that the secured party has
any rights after satisfaction of the debt.
45. E.g., MiNN'. STAT. §§ 170.54, 170.23. (9) (1965).
46. In Commercial Credit Co. v. Standard Baking Co., 45 Ohio
App. 403, 187 N.E. 251 (1933), it was held that the secured party could
not recover from the third party tort feasor in a negligence action
because the debtor may have been contributorily negligent. The oppo-
site result would have forced the third party to bear a loss which he
would not otherwise have borne. See Comment, 40 YALE L.J. 135, 136
(1930). It was, however, even more unfair for the court to shift the
burden from the admittedly negligent third party to the wholly inno-
cent secured party.
47. Contra, Comment, 38 BosTON U.L. REv. 620 (1958).
48. Unfortunately, statutory reform in tort law is unlikely to occur
unless it is promoted by some lobby or pressure group. Peck, The
Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48
MiIN. L. REv. 265, 281-85 (1963). The interests of the third party
tortfeasor are not represented by any such group. Even if we assume
that the third party's liability insurer would be subrogated to such a
remedy, there is no real incentive for the insurance lobby to support
the establishment of this remedy. In many cases the interests of the
debtor and the third party are jointly insured, so that the insurer
cannot recover from the third party tortfeasor anyway. See Part III
infra.
49. Subrogation is an equitable doctrine under which one party
who has satisfied an obligation primarily owed by another party is
allowed to recover from that other person based on the rights the




age to the collateral ultimately ought to be borne by the debtor,
and since the secured party could have initially proceeded against
the debtor, it follows that if the secured party chooses instead
to proceed against the tortfeasor, the tortfeasor upon paying the
loss to the secured party ought to be subrogated to the rights the
secured party initially had against the debtor. The rights of the
secured party to which the tortfeasor could be subrogated are
(1) an action on the underlying debt or (2) an action for neg-
ligent destruction of the collateral.
III. RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES IF INSURED
The interests of the debtor and the secured party may be
insured either separately or jointly by a single insurer in a single
policy. The rights and liabilities of all of the parties are signifi-
cantly different, depending upon the type of insurance chosen.
A. SUBROGATION RIGHTS WHERE THE INTERESTS OF THE DEBTOR AND
SECURED PARTY ARE INSURED SEPARATELY
A property insurer upon paying its insured for a loss may be
subrogated to the rights of the insured against third parties.
Regardless of how the collateral is damaged or destroyed, the
insurer may be subrogated to contract claims of its insured.5 0
Most commonly this type of, subrogation arises where a secured
party has insured his interest in the collateral. The insurer, upon
paying the loss to the secured party, is subrogated to the
rights of the secured party on both the underlying debt and the
security agreement as it extends to the remaining collateral. 51
In addition, equity demands that an insurer be subrogated to
its insured's tort claims.5 2 Thus, if the property is damaged or
destroyed as the result of negligent conduct, the secured party's
50. King, Subrogation Under Contracts Insuring Property, 30 TEXAS
L. REV. 62, 71-72 (1951).
51. An interesting problem arises if, the loss is only. partial and
the insurer exercises his option to repair. Such action by the insurer
would have the effect of simply restoring the collateral. The insurer
could not then be subrogated to the rights of the secured party on the
underlying debt since the secured party has not been satisfied. See
Billings, The Significance of Subrogation in Automobile Insurance Prac-
tice, 1948 INs. L.J. 707, 713. However, the issue remains as to whether
the insurer may be subrogated to the tort claim of the secured party
against the debtor. Arguably, if such recovery threatened the solvency
of the debtor, the insurer may be prohibited from recovery since the
subrogation rights of the insurer should not interfere with the rights of
its insured, the secured party, to collect on the debt.
52. King, supra note 50, at 64-65.
1968] 1013
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
insurer would be subrogated to negligence claims of the secured
party. These subrogation claims may be against either the
debtor or third party or both, depending upon which was negli-
gent. Similarly if the third party's negligence is the sole cause
of the damage, the debtor's insurer would be subrogated to the
debtor's tort claim against the third party.53
A difficult subrogation problem arises where the damage is
caused by the combined negligence of the debtor and a third
party. If the secured party's insurer, who is subrogated to the
tort claim of the secured party, first recovers from the third
party who in turn is indemnified by his liability insurer, the
subrogation rights of the third party's liability insurer must be
determined. It has been demonstrated that absent insurance
the third party, having paid the secured party, is subrogated to
the secured party's rights against the debtor. Achieving a paral-
lel result when each is insured is somewhat more complicated.
The third party's liability insurer is subrogated to the rights of
the third party; the third party, who satisfied the secured party's
insurer, is subrogated to that insurer's rights; and finally the
secured party's insurer is in turn subrogated to all the rights of
the secured party against the debtor. In essence the third
party's insurer is subrogated to a subrogation right which itself
includes a subrogation right.
If recovery is had against the debtor, the question then be-
comes how he will be indemnified. His property insurance could
be one source of indemnification, since he can insure the col-
lateral to its full value and use the proceeds to satisfy his lia-
bility to the third party's insurer. Such a payment causes him
no loss since, although the collateral is not restored, his debt is
discharged. A second source of indemnification might be the
debtor's liability insurance. It is doubtful that he could re-
cover on both since he would then be gaining a windfall.
B. SUBROGATION RIGHTS WHERE THE INTERESTS OF THE DEBTOR AND
SECURED PARTY ARE INSURED IN A SINGLE POLICY
Frequently, the interest of both the debtor and the secured
party will be protected in one insurance policy. They may both
53. J.P. (Bum) Gibbins v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 202 F.2d 467
(10th Cir. 1953); Lacaze v. Morway, 57 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 1952); Sol-
berg v. Minneapolis Willys-Knight Co.. 177 Minn. 10, 224 N.W. 271




be named insureds54 or, more commonly, the secured party may
be protected under some type of mortgage clause. However,
merely because the secured party is protected under a mort-
gage clause does not mean that he is also an "insured." 'There
are two general types of mortgage clauses: the "open mort-
gage" or "loss-payable" clause and the "union" or "standard"
mortgage clause. 5 Under the open mortgage clause, the debt-
or remains the sole named insured and the secured party is
merely an appointee of the insurance proceeds. 56 As an ap-
pointee the secured party is subject to most of the defenses the
insurer may have against the debtor.57 In contrast, under the
union mortgage clause the debtor and the secured party are sep-
arate insureds, and thus many defenses good against the debtor
will not be good against the secured party.58 For the purposes
of this Article the most important distinction between the two
types of clauses is the difference in the subrogation rights inur-
ing to the benefit of the insurer. Under an open mortgage clause,
the insurer can be subrogated only to the rights of the debtor
since the debtor is the sole insured.59 In contrast, under the
union mortgage clause the insurer could be subrogated to the
54. Bankers Inv. Co. v. Calloway, 183 Kan. 1, 325 P.2d 66 (1958).
55. See, e.g., G. CoucH, INSURANcE §§ 42.647-49, 42.690 (2d ed.
1963). It appears that even though such clauses are termed "mortgage"
clauses, they are applicable to other types of security interests as well.
National Cas. Co. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 161 So. 2d 848,
852 (Fla. App. 1964).
56. E.g., Posner v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 49 Ill. App. 2d 209, 199 N.E.2d
44 (1964).
57. E.g., Southwestern Funding Corp. v. Motors Ins. Corp., 59 Cal.
2d 91, 28 Cal. Rptr. 161, 378 P.2d 361 (1963) (en banc).
Even under an open mortgage clause the insurer will not be able
to resist the secured party's claim to the proceeds on the grounds that
the debtor settled with the third party tortfeasor, thus defeating the
insurer's subrogation rights. Remedial Sys. of Loaning v. New Hamp-
shire Fire Ins. Co., 227 Ky. 652, 13 S.W.2d 1005 (1929); Sargent v. Fire-
man's Ins. Co., 89 N.H. 171, 195 A. 346 (1937); Superior Lloyds of
America v. Boesch Loan Co., 153 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
Contra, Elmore v. Royal Ins. Co., 154 Kan. 93, 114 P.2d 786 (1941).
58. Mossler Acceptance Co. v. Moore, 218 Miss. 757, 67 So. 2d 868(1953); National Cas. Co. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 161 So.
2d 848 (Fla. App. 1964); Bennett Motor Co. v. Lyon, 14 Utah 2d 161,
38 P.2d 69 (1963).
59. Solberg v. Minneapolis Willys-Knight Co., 177 Minn. 10, 224
N.W. 271 (1929) (apparently an open mortgage clause-see Record
at 14). Cf. Capital Fire Ins. Co. v. Longhorne, 146 F.2d 237 (8th Cir.
1945) (applying Minnesota law).
However, if the debtor settles with the tortfeasor and the insurer
must pay the secured party, note 57 supra, the insurer may be subro-
gated to the underlying obligation. Remedial Sys. of Loaning v. New
Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 227 Ky. 652, 13 S.W.2d 1005 (1929).
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rights of either the debtor or the secured party against third
parties.60 Of course, assuming that the insurer has no defense
good against the debtor, it cannot be subrogated to the rights
of the secured party against the debtor since he is its own in-
sured,61 and such subrogation would render the debtor's protec-
tion under the policy worthless.62
If both the debtor and secured party are insureds under a
single policy and the damage to the collateral is caused by the
sole negligence of a third party, the subrogation rights are clear
and simple. The secured party's insurer may seek recovery
from the third party based on either the tort claim of the debtor
or the tort claim of the secured party. However, that insurer
cannot be subrogated to the rights of the secured party on the
underlying debt since the debtor is its own insured.
A more difficult situation arises where the loss is caused by
the combined negligence of the debtor and a third party. In-
itially it is obvious that the insurer can no more be subrogated
to the secured party's right against the debtor in tort than on
the underlying debt. The one case in which the problem was
presented did, however, hold that the insurer is subrogated to
the rights of the secured party against the third party.
In Harvard Trust Company v. Racheotes,63 the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court was presented with an undisputed fac-
tual situation. An automobile owned and operated by one Leon-
ard collided with an automobile operated by Racheotes. It was
agreed that both were negligent. The Leonard automobile suf-
fered $506.11 in damages. Prior to the accident Leonard had
mortgaged the automobile to the Harvard Trust Company to
secure a loan of $424, $318 of which remained outstanding at the
time of the accident. The Home Insurance Company of New
York had issued a $50 deductible collision policy, apparently with
a standard mortgage clause, in favor of the Harvard Trust Com-
pany. 4 Leonard paid $50 of the repair costs, and Home paid the
60. Cf. Comment, 49 CoLum. L. REv. 866, 868 (1949).
61. Palisano v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 276 App. Div. 523,
95 N.Y.S. 2d 543 (1950).
62. E.g., G. CoucH, INsaANcE. § 61.369 (2d ed. 1964).
63. 337 Mass. 73, 147 N.E.2d 817 (1958).
64. The mortgage required only that a policy be acquired with an
open mortgage clause. The precise terms of the policy were not given
by the court, but without discussion it subrogated the insurer to the
rights of the secured party. In this regard consider Remedial Sys. of
Loaning v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 227 Ky. 652, 13 S.W.2d 1005
(1929), where a Kentucky court suggested that it would have been
willing to subrogate the insurer under an open mortgage clause to the
rights of the secured party against the tortfeasor.
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balance with a check payable to both Leonard and Harvard.
Home then brought an action in the name of Harvard to recover
the amount of the loss it had paid. The court asserted that Home
was subrogated to the rights of Harvard against Racheotes. On
that premise Home was awarded $318 since Home as subrogee of
the mortgagee, Harvard, could recover from Racheotes, the tort-
feasor, at least to the extent of the outstanding debt.
The error of the Harvard court is apparent from the dilemma
which its result presents. As previously demonstrated, if the
debtor is contributorily negligent, the third party tortfeasor, or
his insurer who has paid the secured party's insurer, ought to be
subrogated ultimately to the rights of the secured party against
the debtor.0 5 Certainly the third party tortfeasor's rights in this
regard ought not be altered by the fact that the debtor and the
secured party are both insured by a single insurer. Yet allow-
ing the tortfeasor to recover from the debtor would permit the
insurer of the debtor and the secured party to do indirectly what
it could not do directly. That insurer could not itself be subro-
gated to the rights of the secured party against its own insured.
That being so, how can it shift the loss to the debtor by itself
recovering from the third party whose liability insurer in turn
recovers from the debtor?
The dilemma can only be resolved by initially refusing to
allow the insurer of both the debtor and the secured party to be
subrogated to the rights of the secured party against the tort-
feasor. It is no answer to say that the tortfeasor or his liability
insurer may recover from the debtor, and the debtor may then be
indemnified by his insurer. The insurer may simply defend on
the grounds that it has already paid the loss, but more signifi-
cantly such a result creates a circuity: the insurer of the debtor
65. However, strictly applying subrogation principles, the tort-
feasor or his insurer could not be subrogated to the rights of the
secured party against the debtor because the joint insurer, through
which their rights flow, could not be subrogated to the rights of the
secured party against the debtor. As previously demonstrated where
the parties are insured separately the third party's liability insurer
would be subrogated to the rights of the third party, who in turn is
subrogated to the rights of the third party's insurer. It was further
demonstrated that the right of the secured party's insurer, to which
the third party or his insurer is so subrogated, consists of its right to be
subrogated to the rights of the secured party against the debtor. How-
ever, where the secured party and the debtor are jointly insured, their
insurer could not be subrogated to the secured party's rights against the
debtor since it cannot be subrogated to rights against its own insured.
Therefore, the third party or his insurer cannot be subrogated through
the joint insurer to the rights of the secured party against the debtor.
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and secured party recovers from the tortfeasor or his liability
insurer, the tortfeasor or his insurer recovers from the debtor,
and, finally, the debtor recovers from the insurer of the debtor
and secured party. Thus, it is clear that the Massachusetts court
was wrong in the Harvard case.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the remedies for the negligent damage or destruc-
tion of collateral have not been completely developed by case
law or legislation, certain basic rules can and should be deduced
from the existing cases and principles. While the secured party
usually is found to have standing to bring an action to recover
for the negligent damage or destruction of the collateral, the
courts are split on whether his recovery should be limited to the
amount of the debt. On balance, however, it seems that the
secured party should be permitted to recover for all the dam-
age done to the collateral in order to avoid a multiplicity of
suits. While the secured party should be able to maintain an ac-
tion against a debtor whose negligence has caused damage to or
the destruction of the collateral, where the collateral has been
damaged or destroyed by the combined negligence of the debtor
and a third party, the third party should be able to recover from
the debtor any damages the secured party has recovered from
him.
Insurance is a complicating factor in analyzing these situa-
tions because of the subrogation problems which are presented.
Where the debtor and the secured party are jointly insured,
their insurer should not be subrogated to the rights of either
of them against the third party tortfeasor, if the third party
has a good defense, such as contributory negligence, against the
other insured. The insurer should not be subrogated to the
rights of one of its insureds, ignoring its basic liability to the
other under the policy.
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